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The United States Supreme Court and a majority of the states1 
have chosen to focus attention in the entrapment area on the individ-
ual: his state of mind, his actions, and his relationship with govern-
ment officers. This majority view rejects the objective rule sometimes 
applied in entrapment cases and favors a subjective test. 2 The sense 
has been that the entrapment test is not based on a particular constitu-
tional principle or a particular construction of the substantive criminal 
law. Yet, the subjective test was developed in response to a concern 
about the legislative intent of Congress in adopting its substantive 
criminal code sections: Congress could not have intended an innocent 
individual to be found guilty of a crime when a government agent im-
properly induced that person into committing the criminal act. The 
United States Supreme Court has made this point repeatedly in nu-
merous decisions. The following excerpts are illustrative: 
Literal interpretation of statutes at the expense of the reason 
of the law and producing absurd consequences or flagrant 
injustice has frequently been condemned. 
We think that this established principle of construction 
is applicable here. We are unable to conclude that it was the 
intention of the Congress in enacting this statute that its 
processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by 
the instigation by government officials of an act on the part 
* Paul Marcus, 1987. During the coming year, Dean Marcus will complete THE 
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE (Kluwer & Co.). 
** Dean and Professor of Law, University of Arizona. 
1. For a good discussion of the state statutes which follow the subjective principle, see 
Park, The Emrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REv. 163 (1976). 
2. The objective test, of course, focuses its attention almost exclusively on the conduct of 
the Government agents; thus, the individual defendant becomes somewhat irrelevant to the de-
termination of whether entrapment existed. For thoughtful discussions of the point, see the opin-
ion of Justice Roberts concurring in the judgment in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 
(1932), and the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 
369, 378 (1958). Both of these cases are discussed at length in Marcus, The Entrapment Defense 
and the Procedural Issues, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 197 (1986). 
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of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its 
commission and to punish them. . . . [T]he Government in 
such a case is estopped to prosecute or the courts should bar 
the prosecution. 3; 
The case at bar illustrates an evil which the defense of 
entrapment is designed to overcome. The government in-
former entices someone attempting to avoid narcotics not 
only into carrying out an illegal sale but also into returning 
to the habit of use. Selecting the proper time, the informer 
then tells the government agent. The set-up is accepted by 
the agent without even a question as to the manner in which 
the informer encountered the seller. Thus the Government 
plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguiles 
him into committing crimes which he otherwise would not 
have attempted. Law enforcement does not require methods 
such as this. 4; and 
[E]ntrapment is a relatively limited defense. It is rooted, not 
in any authority of the Judicial Branch to dismiss prosecu-
tions for what it feels to have been "overzealous law enforce-
ment," but instead in the notion that Congress could not 
have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has 
committed all the elements of a proscribed offense, but was 
induced to commit them by the government. 5 
Justice Rehnquist also noted in United States v. Hampton : 
"[T]he entrapment defense 'focus[es] on the intent or predisposition of 
the defendant to commit the crime,' rather than upon the conduct of 
the Government's agents."6 
The lower federal courts have also stated that the principal focus 
in the entrapment area is on the individual defendant on trial. 7 The 
Fifth Circuit recently stated the matter quite clearly: "The entrap-
ment defense focuses on the intent or predisposition of the defendant 
to commit the crime rather than on the conduct of the government's 
3. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 446-48 (1932) (Hughes, C.J.). 
4. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958) (Warren, C.J.) (footnote omitted). 
5. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.). 
6. 425 U.S. 484, 488 (1976) (quoting Russell, 411 U.S. at 429). 
7. To be distinguished from the attention which would be given, under the objective test, 
to government conduct. As stated by Justice Frankfurter in the Sherman case, 
It is surely sheer fiction to suggest that a conviction cannot be had when a defend· 
ant has been entrapped by government officers or informers because "Congress could 
not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons 
into violations .... " 
The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not because his conduct falls 
outside the proscription of the statute, but because, even if his guilt be admitted, the 
methods employed on behalf of the Government to bring about conviction cannot be 
countenanced. 
356 U.S. at 379, 380. 
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agents .... The question of entrapment goes to the basic guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant.''8 
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Lard 9 relied on an earlier 
opinion of Justice Brandeis when it summarized the subjective test: 
The entrapment defense is based on the assumption that 
Congress did not intend to punish a defendant who has com-
mitted all the elements of a proscribed offense upon the in-
ducement or instigation of government agents. . . . "[T]he 
Government may set decoys to entrap criminals. But it may 
not provoke or create a crime and then punish the criminal, 
its creature.''10 
II. THE ELEMENTS OF THE TEsT 
Given that the basis for the subjective entrapment defense is the 
nature of the relationship that the individual has with the government, 
it is not surprising that the actual test used in practice focuses on the 
two main elements described below. The Court in Sorrells explained: 
"[T]he issues raised and the evidence adduced must be pertinent to the 
controlling question whether the defendant is a person otherwise inno-
cent whom the government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense 
which is the product of the creative activity of its own officials." 11 
A few statutory references also illustrate this two-part analysis. 
The Illinois code provides as follows: 
A person is not guilty of an offense if his conduct is incited or 
induced by a public officer or employee or agent of either, for 
the purpose of obtaining evidence for the prosecution of such 
person. However, this Section is inapplicable if a public of-
ficer or employee, or agent of either, merely affords to such 
person the opportunity or facility for committing an offense 
in furtherance of a criminal purpose which such person has 
originated. 12 
The Missouri law is even more specific: 
An "entrapment" is perpetuated [sic] if a law enforcement 
officer or a person acting in cooperation with such an officer, 
8. United States v. Yater, 756 F.2d 1058, 1062 (5th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 
106 S. Ct. 225 (1985). The court went on to explain that the defense had to show that the 
government agent created "a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person 
other than one ready to commit it." /d. at 1062 n.6 (quoting Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 
163, 168 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
9. 734 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1984). 
10. 734 F.2d at 1292 (quoting Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting)). 
11. United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932). 
12. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38. para. 7-12 (Smith-Hurd 1972). 
55 
AM. J. CRIM. LAW Vol. 14:53 (1987) 
for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of 
an offense, solicits, encourages or otherwise induces another 
person to engage in conduct when he was not ready and will-
ing to engage in such conduct. 13 
It is clear from Supreme Court discussions and various statutory 
provisions that under the subjective test for entrapment the two pri-
mary issues to be litigated at trial are:14 (1) evidence of inducement by 
government agents; and (2) the state of mind of the defendant. While 
recognizing that these two questions are usually at issue in entrapment 
cases, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Hunt 15 concluded that 
the predisposition element of the two-part analysis is the more impor-
tant one. It explained that "the essential element of the entrapment 
defense is the defendant's lack of predisposition to commit the crime 
charged."16 The court's conclusion that the predisposition element is 
the determinative one may have been correct, but that conclusion 
might have been reached somewhat quickly. In many cases a host of 
issues involved with inducement must also be considered. These issues 
include: (1) the impropriety of inducement as a matter of law; (2) the 
mechanics of proving inducement; (3) the nature of the burden of 
proof as to inducement; and ( 4) the distinction between questions of 
law and questions of fact with respect to government inducement. 
A. Is Inducement Proper? 
Courts have recognized consistently that some form of govern-
ment inducement or enticement may be appropriate in seeking to en-
gage the defendant in criminal conduct. Indeed, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist has indicated that such government action may be not only 
proper but also necessary, particularly in cases where the nature of the 
criminal activity is such as to avoid criminal detection. In United 
States v. Russell, 17 government agents supplied the defendants with an 
ingredient that was difficult for the defendants to obtain, but necessary 
to enable the defendants to manufacture an illegal drug. The govern-
ment officers arrested the defendants as soon as the drug was manufac-
tured. Justice Rehnquist responded to the defense argument that such 
government involvement in crime was inherently improper: 
13. Mo. REV. STAT.§ 562.066.2 (1978). 
14. The matter is normally resolved at trial. Most claims cannot be disposed of pretrial. 
See infra text accompanying notes 31-34. 
15. 749 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3479 (1985). 
16. /d. at 1085. But see State v. Martin, 77 N.C. App. 61, 334 S.E.2d 459 (1985); People v. 
Boalbey, 143 Ill. App. 3d 362, 493 N.E.2d 369 (1986). 
17. 411 u.s. 423 (1973). 
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The illicit manufacture of drugs is not a sporadic, iso-
lated criminal incident, but a continuing, though illegal, 
business enterprise. In order to obtain convictions for ille-
gally manufacturing drugs, the gathering of evidence of past 
unlawful conduct frequently proves to be an all but impossi-
ble task. Thus in drug-related offenses law enforcement per-
sonnel have turned to one of the only practicable means of 
detection: the infiltration of drug rings and a limited partici-
pation in their unlawful present practices. Such infiltration 
is a recognized and permissible means of investigation; if that 
be so, then the supply of some item of value that the drug 
ring requires must, as a general rule, also be permissible. For 
an agent will not be taken into the confidence of the illegal 
entrepreneurs unless he has something of value to offer them. 
Law enforcement tactics such as this can hardly be said to 
violate "fundamental fairness" or [be] "shocking to the uni-
versal sense of justice."18 
Another judge recently pointed out that "the entrapment defense has 
no application where the government agents merely use stealth, strat-
egy, or deception to trap an 'unwary criminal' or merely provide the 
defendant with an opportunity or facility to commit the crime."19 
It is clear, therefore, that inducement as such is not inherently 
improper or unlawful under the subjective entrapment test. Induce-
ment can, however, exceed permissible bounds and become suject to 
sanction. Indeed, the very judge who made the comment quoted 
above further remarked that the government cannot be involved in the 
"manufacturing of crime." Citing the majority opinion in Sherman 
the judge quoted, "The function of law enforcement is the prevention 
of crime and the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function 
does not include the manufacturing of crime."20 
18. 411 U.S. at 432. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, continued: "Nor does it 
seem particularly desirable for the law to grant complete immunity from prosecution to one who 
himself planned to commit a crime, and then committed it, simply because government under-
cover agents subjected him to inducement, which might have seduced a hypothetical individual 
who was not so predisposed." !d. at 434. The dissenters in the case strongly disagreed with the 
majority opinion. 
In this case, the chemical ingredient was available only to licensed persons, and the 
Government itself had requested suppliers not to sell that ingredient even to people 
with a license. Yet the Government agent readily offered, and supplied, that ingredient 
to an unlicensed person and asked him to make a certain illegal drug with it. The 
Government then prosecuted that person for making the drug produced with the very 
ingrediellt which its agent had so helpfully supplied. This strikes me as the very pattern 
of conduct that should be held to constitute entrapment as a matter of law. 
411 U.S. at 449 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
19. United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1984). 
20. Id. (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958)). 
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The majority in Sherman emphasized that to " 'merely afford op-
portunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does not' con-
stitute entrapment. Entrapment occurs only when the criminal 
conduct was 'the product of the creative activity' of law enforcement 
officials. "21 
In connection with the issue of inducement in entrapment cases, 
two central questions arise: (1) procedurally, how does one prove suf-
ficient inducement to have that issue submitted as a question of fact 
for the jury; and (2) when is inducement sufficiently proved as a mat-
ter of law. 
B. Proving Inducement: The Procedural Issues 
In practice, relatively few procedural problems seem to arise with 
respect to the inducement prong of the entrapment test. 22 The rules 
may be stated with succinctness and clarity. It is not enough for the 
defendant to show that government agents offered him an opportunity 
to engage in criminal activity. Something more overreaching on the 
part of the government is necessary. As stated by the court in United 
States v. Christopher: "[It is not enough] that the Government fur-
nished the opportunity for the commission of a crime .... [There must 
still be] some evidence of inducement or persuasion by the 
Government. "23 
The principal problem in this area arises with defining what is 
sufficient government conduct to constitute inducement, and not the 
mere offering of an opportunity.Z4 Nevertheless, the law is now well-
settled that the burden of offering evidence of inducement rests, at 
21. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (quoting United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 241, 251 
(1932)) (emphasis in Sherman). 
22. For detailed discussion of the procedural issues involved with this question, see Marcus, 
supra note 2. 
23. 488 F.2d 849, 850·51 (9th Cir. 1973). The court in United States v. Andrews, 765 F.2d 
1491, 1499 (11th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 815 (1985), explained the basic 
point: 
58 
[E]vidence that the government agent sought out or initiated contact with the defend-
ant, or was the first to propose the illicit transaction, has been held to be insufficient to 
meet the defendant's burden. The defendant must demonstrate not merely inducement 
or suggestion on the part of the government but "an element of persuasion or mild 
coercion." The defendant may make such a showing by demonstrating that he had not 
favorably received the government plan and the government had had to "push it" on 
him, or that several attempts at setting up an illicit deal had failed and on at least one 
occasion he had directly refused to participate. When the defendant makes such a 
showing, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense charged. 
24. This problem will be explored infra in text accompanying notes 35-88. 
Proving Entrapment 
least initially, on the defendant, not on the government.25 If the de-
fendant offers sufficient evidence of inducement, the burden then shifts 
to the government with respect to the question of predisposition. 
While the courts are not in agreement as to the evidentiary bur-
den that the defense must meet, it is fair to say that the burden is a 
limited one. Some courts require evidence which amounts to "more 
than a scintilla,"26 others discuss "any foundation in the evidence;m 
and still others mention "some evidence" of government induce-
ment. 28 However, the majority of courts rely on the traditional pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard. Thus, if the defendant offers 
evidence sufficient to demonstrate that he has more likely than not 
been the victim of government inducement, the burden as to predispo-
sition will then shift to the government. 29 
The defendant at trial can satisfy the appropriate standard by of-
fering evidence to demonstrate inducement, or by showing that the 
government's evidence reveals its inducement.30 The defendant gener-
ally cannot make this showing prior to the trial. The courts have been 
fairly consistent in noting that the issues concerning inducement and 
predisposition tend to be evidentiary in nature and are thus ill-suited 
for pretrial decisions. In State v. Roberts the court refused to allow the 
defendant to raise the entrapment defense during a pretrial hearing on 
a motion to suppress.31 Similarly, most courts will hold that when a 
defendant seeks to enter a guilty plea, such a plea waives the defend-
ant's right to claim the defense of entrapment. 32 An exception to the 
25. See, e.g., United States v. Sarmiento, 786 F.2d 665, 667 (5th Cir. 1986). Some courts 
have adopted a "unitary standard" such that if the defendant demonstrates some act of induce-
ment by the government the case still cannot go to the jury unless there is evidence showing 
"unreadiness" on the defendant's own part. See United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 943 
(3d Cir. 1986); Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 374 (1st Cir. 1967). In some courts the 
procedure becomes more awkward as to this unitary standard. These cases require the defendant 
to respond to the government's showing of predisposition with a demonstration oflack of predis-
position. See, e.g., the discussion in United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 440 U.S. 966 (1978). 
26. United States v. Wollfs, 594 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1979). 
27. United States v. Timberlake, 559 F.2d 1375, 1379 (5th Cir. 1977). 
28. Burkley, 591 F.2d at 914. 
29. The preponderance test has been supported by the drafters of both the Model Penal 
Code and the proposed revised Federal Criminal Code. Though each involves the objective test 
(not the majority subjective test) the initial inducement burden appears similar in the MoDEL 
PENAL CoDE§ 2.13(2) (1985) and the FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS§ 702(1) (1971).' 
30. United States v. Gunter, 741 F.2d 151, 153 (7th Cir. 1984). 
31. 471 So.2d 900 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
32. United States v. Yater, 756 F.2d 1058, 1063 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 225 
(1985). See also Eaton v. United States, 458 F.2d 704, 707 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 
(1972). 
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pretrial rule may be found in cases where a motion in limine is 
brought. For example, in State v. Burciaga 33 the government an-
nounced at a pretrial hearing its intention to introduce evidence of the 
defendant's prior conviction as bearing on the issue of his predisposi-
tion. The defendant's motion in limine on this point was granted and 
affirmed on appeal. 34 
The element of inducement can rarely be shown to be a question 
of law that must be decided by the judge. Courts in almost all cases 
have determined that both the questions of whether inducement ex-
isted and whether it was sufficient are questions of fact. The eviden-
tiary burden to be met in order to have the judge decide the issue as a 
matter of law is a high one: "[T]he evidence must clearly have indi-
cated that a government agent originated the criminal design; that the 
agent implanted in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to 
commit the offense; and that the defendant then committed the crimi-
nal act at the urging of the government agent."35 
Defendants often lose their claims as a matter of law because all 
they can show is that a government agent afforded an opportunity or 
facilities for the commission of an offense. 36 The defendant will pre-
vail as a matter of law only "when the criminal intent originates with 
the officer and the defendant is lured or induced into the commission 
of a crime he was not ready and willing to engage in . . . . "37 
Under unusual circumstances the defendant may win as a matter 
of law. The most famous example is the United States Supreme Court 
case of Sherman v. United States. 38 The defendant in Sherman had a 
history of selling drugs and was being treated for narcotics addiction. 
When a government agent approached the defendant in an attempt to 
buy drugs, the defendant initially was reluctant to make the sale. Ulti-
mately he acceded to the strong wishes of the informant. The defend-
ant was convicted of selling drugs to the government agent. The 
Court held that these facts showed entrapment as a matter of law39 
and voiced strong disapproval of the government's actions: 
The government informer entices someone attempting to 
avoid narcotics not only into carrying out an illegal sale but 
33. 146 Ariz. 333, 705 P.2d 1384 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). 
34. /d. at 1386-87. 
35. United States v. Shaw, 570 F.2d 770, 772 (8th Cir. 1978). 
36. United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640, 647 (8th Cir. 1976). See also United States v. 
Randolph, 738 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1984). 
37. State v. Arnold, 676 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). See generally United States v. 
Lard, 734 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1984). 
38. 356 u.s. 369 (1958). 
39. /d. at 376. 
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also into returning to the habit of use .... Thus the Govern-
ment plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party and be-
guiles him into committing crimes which he otherwise would 
not have attempted. Law enforcement does not require 
methods such as this. 40 
Sherman was expanded for some time to cover cases in which the 
evidence clearly showed that government agents "supplied all the in-
gredients of the offense: the plan, the marijuana, the buyer, the money 
for the purchase."41 Under such circumstances some courts held that 
"[t]he criminal conduct is clearly the product of the creative activity of 
the law enforcement offi.cers."42 However, the Supreme Court 
sounded the death knell for this principle in Hampton v. United 
States.43 In Hampton the Court noted that the essential question in 
such a case of government involvement was not the degree of govern-
ment activity, but rather the predisposition of the defendant.44 
Judge Gesell presented one of the most thoughtful and detailed 
discussions of the question of inducement as a matter of law in one of 
the major Abscam cases, United States v. Kelly.45 In Kelly the FBI 
created a fictitious organization, Abdul Enterprises, through which it 
conducted a series of negotiations that resulted in making contact with 
the defendant about assisting a member of the organization with an 
immigration problem. An arrangement was made in which the de-
fendant, a Congressman, would receive $25,000 "as a down payment if 
he promised to introduce immigration legislation on behalf of one of 
the sheiks."46 Later the defendant was promised a total sum of 
$500,000 for his assistance with this problem. Additionally, millions 
of dollars were to be invested in the defendant's congressional district 
in Florida. Numerous negotiations and alterations of the arrangement 
occurred. The FBI videotaped the defendant as he reassured the prin-
cipals that he would perform the requested services. The defendant 
was convicted of: (1) conspiracy to commit bribery and to defraud the 
United States;47 (2) bribery;48 and (3) interstate travel to engage in 
racketeering enterprises.49 The jury was instructed that it could acquit 
40. Jd. (footnote omitted). 
41. State v. Boccelli, 105 Ariz. 495, 497, 467 P.2d 740, 742 (1970) (en bane). 
42. !d. at 742. See also United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
411 u.s. 949 (1973). 
43. 425 u.s. 484 (1976). 
44. Jd. at 488, 489. 
45. 748 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
46. Jd. at 693. 
47. 18 u.s.c. § 371 (1982). 
48. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (1982). 
49. 18 u.s.c. § 1952 (1982). 
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the defendant based upon the entrapment claim if it found that the 
defendant had been induced to commit the crime and that there was a 
reasonable doubt concerning his predisposition. 
The defendant in Kelly argued that inducement had been estab-
lished as a matter of law; therefore, the issue should not have been 
submitted to the jury. The court recognized that "[i]nducement fo-
cuses on whether the government's conduct could have caused an un-
disposed person to commit a crime."50 The court noted that the 
inquiry was an objective one "measuring whether the government's 
behavior was such that a law-abiding citizen's will to obey the law 
could have been overborne."51 The defendant argued that the case 
should never have gone to the jury on the inducement question be-
cause the evidence was clearly sufficient on this issue. The government 
contended that its offer to the defendant amounted to nothing more 
than giving the defendant "a single opportunity to commit a crime."52 
The court ultimately decided that this issue was a question for the jury 
that could not be decided as a matter of law: 
Reasonable persons could differ as to whether the amount of 
money offered Kelly and the manner in which the offer un-
folded went beyond merely offering Kelly an opportunity to 
commit a crime. The question of how a reasonable person 
would have reacted is a quintessential jury issue, and the evi-
dence here is not so unequivocal to mandate one conclusion 
or another. Although the trial court had a personal view 
that there was some evidence of inducement, it was scrupu-
lously correct in deciding that a reasonable juror could come 
to a different conclusion, and it correctly refused to find in-
ducement as a matter of law. 53 
The focus of the inducement issue, whether "government conduct 
... created a risk of persuading [an] unpredisposed person to commit 
the crime,"54 is especially appropriate for jury determination. The 
type of government activity and its impact on the defendant almost 
always appear to be issues for the jury. The Fifth Circuit stated in 
50. 748 F.2d at 697. 
51. /d. at 698. 
52. /d. 
53. Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). In People v. Boalbey, 143 III. App. 3d 362, 493 
N.E.2d 369 (1986), entrapment was found as a matter of law. The case concerned the sale of 
food stamps. No evidence regarding the defendant's predisposition was ever offered. The gov· 
ernment's proof of the defendant's willingness to participate "cannot fill the evidentiary void." 
/d. at 371. 
54. State v. Jones, 416 A.2d 676, 677 (R.I. 1980). See also United States v. Manning, 787 
F.2d 431, 437 (8th Cir. 1986). 
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United States v. Yater :55 "The government's provision of aid, incen-
tive, and opportunity to commit the crime does not amount to entrap-
ment unless it appears that the 'defendant has done that which he 
would never have done were it not for the inducement of Government 
operatives.' "56 
The jury should hear most issues involving inducement. 57 How-
ever, the question of inducement is usually a question of law for the 
judge when the defendant can only offer evidence that "a government 
agent has provided the accused with the opportunity or facilities for 
the commission of the crime.''58 This principle has been stated repeat-
edly and consistently in the jurisdictions that have adopted the subjec-
tive standard. For example, Georgia does not recognize an 
entrapment defense "when the officer merely furnishes an opportunity 
to a person who is ready to commit the offense."59 In the federal 
courts the principle is the same. In United States v. Kadis 60 the court 
stated, "[There must be evidence] that a government agent corrupted 
him ... but such a showing is not made simply by evidence of a solici-
tation."61 The First Circuit approved the district court's charge that 
"entrapment means that law enforcement officials, acting either di-
rectly or through an agent, induced or persuaded an otherwise unwill-
ing person to commit an unlawful act.''62 The court went on to say, 
" '[M]erely affording the defendant the opportunity for commission of 
the offense does not constitute entrapment.' " 63 
This theory is applied most often in cases in which the govern-
ment allegations involve drug violations, fraud schemes, or the com-
mission of sexual offenses. The government allegations in United 
55. 756 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 225 (1985). 
56. Id. at 1062 (quoting United States v. Bower, 575 F.2d 499, 504 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 983 (1978)). The court quoted extensively from earlier decisions in elaborating on this 
explanation. In a footnote, the court adopted the language of Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 
163, 168 (5th Cir. 1969), to the effect that the defense could be raised where the government 
conduct created "a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person other than 
one ready to commit it ...• " The court made it clear that merely providing an opportunity to 
commit the crime did not create such a risk. Id. at n.6. 
57. See infra text accompanying notes 74-86. 
58. Yater, 156 F.2d at 1062 n.6. 
59. Verble v. State, 172 Ga. App. 321, 321, 323 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1984). 
60. 373 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1967). Remember that the First Circuit expressly rejected the 
"bifurcation" of the test for entrapment between inducement and predisposition. Id. at 373-74. 
That court has persisted in that view. United States v. Parisi, 674 F.2d 126, 127 (1st Cir. 1982). 
For a discussion of this "unitary" standard see supra note 25. 
61. 373 F.2d at 374. 
62. United States v. Bibbey, 735 F.2d 619, 621 (1st Cir. 1984). 
63. /d. at 621-22 (quoting United States v. Fera, 616 F.2d 590, 596 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
446 u.s. 969 (1980)). 
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States v. Gunter 64 involved drug violations. The defendant in Gunter 
offered evidence that a government agent contacted him and agreed to 
buy cocaine from him. 65 The court was unimpressed with the claim 
and voiced "serious doubts as to whether there was even enough evi-
dence of inducement ... to raise the defense of entrapment."66 The 
court discussed the point further: 
The only evidence of entrapment before the first sale was [the 
police agent's] testimony that he made contact with [the de-
fendant] several times to set up the drug purchase, and that 
he paid $1,200 for what turned out to be 12.3 grams of co-
caine. We are not impressed by defendant's argument that 
[the police agent's] admission that he made contact with [the 
defendant] demonstrates either a lack of predisposition or 
Government inducement. Drug dealers are not known to 
call potential clients and solicit their business, rather a dealer 
who expects to stay out of jail is careful about to whom he 
sells. That [the police agent] made several calls to arrange 
the sale is also not extraordinary. Drug deals often take time 
to arrange. We are similarly unimpressed by defendant's 
claim that $1,200 was such a large amount of money to pay 
for the cocaine that it amounted to undue inducement. This 
argument ignores that defendants claimed to be providing 14 
grams, not 12.3 grams, and that it was only their own dis-
honesty that reaped them greater profit. Second, there was 
evidence that cocaine often sold for $100 a gram, so $1,200 
for more than 12 grams was not unusual. The mere solicita-
tion by [the police agent], and the offer of an opportunity to 
commit the crime, does not show entrapment. 67 
The rule is also followed in fraud cases such as United States v. 
Randolph 68 where the defendant was found guilty of unlawfully ac-
quiring food stamp coupons. An undercover agent of the United 
States Department of Agriculture contacted the defendant in Ran-
64. 741 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1984). 
65. What is so troublesome in many of these cases is the "unclean hands" of the govern· 
ment agent who is alleged to have entrapped the defendant. As the court in Gunter noted: 
As with many informants, Gannon was not motivated by a fervent desire to combat 
crime, but rather by a promise that his work would reduce the consequences of his own 
criminal conduct. In return for setting up purchases from drug dealers Gannon was to 
receive consideration on charges that he stole a late model Corvette Stingray automo· 
bile. Gannon also received $100 for every purchase. 
Id. at 152. 
66. /d. at 153. 
67. Id. at 153-54. Following this general principle in drug cases are these opinions: State v. 
Martin, 713 P.2d 60 (Utah 1986); State v. Gilman, 110 R.I. 207, 291 A.2d 425 (1972); Goss-
meyer v. State, 482 N.E.2d 239 {Ind. 1985); and Gonzales v. State, 697 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1985, pet. ref'd). 
68. 738 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1984). 
64 
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dolph and offered to sell her food stamp coupons at a discount. The 
offer was to sell the food stamps for a discount of more than 50% of 
their face value, a clear violation of federal law. 69 This transaction 
was the basis of the conviction. The defendant claimed that she had 
been entrapped as a matter of law because of the government's im-
proper action. The court rejected this argument: "There was no evi-
dence that [the agent] did anything other than offer [defendant] the 
opportunity to commit a crime. This does not constitute 
entrapment. "70 
In Verble v. State 71 the court considered the defense claim on the 
inducement issue in connection with various sex crimes. The police 
officers in Verble contacted the defendants while investigating adver-
tisements placed in a magazine. The language in the magazine led the 
officers to believe that by placing the ads the defendants were advertis-
ing sex for hire. The officers contacted the defendants through a 
phone number listed in the ads, arranged for a meeting at a motel 
room, and gave money to the defendants. The defendants told the 
officers that in exchange for the money the men would perform sod-
omy on the officers. The defendants claimed that they had been en-
trapped into committing the crime and thus could not be found guilty. 
The court concluded that a guilty verdict was indeed appropriate be-
cause the evidence showed that "the officer merely furnished appel-
lants an opportunity to solicit sodomy and that they were also guilty 
beyond reasonable doubt. "72 
As Sherman illustrates, it is possible for the defendant to win his 
inducement claim as a matter of law. However, it is more likely that 
the defendant will fail to offer sufficient evidence to establish induce-
ment as a matter of law and, instead, will be able to offer evidence only 
of the government's offering him an opportunity to engage in criminal 
activities.73 The inducement issue is generally a jury question to be 
raised in connection with the issue of predisposition. 
69. In violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b) (1982). 
70. 738 F.2d at 246 (quoting Holmes v. United States, 709 F.2d 19, 20 (8th Cir. 1983) (per 
curiam) (citation omitted)). See also United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1976) (dis· 
cussing test to find entrapment as a matter of law). 
71. 172 Ga. App. 321, 323 S.E.2d 239 (1984). 
72. Id. at 321-22, 323 S.E.2d at 241. 
73. The very nature of some crimes may make it difficult for the defendant to use the in-
ducement claim. For instance, in State v. Jones, 598 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn. 1980), the court noted 
that "where solicitation is the gist of an offense and an indispensable element thereof, the defense 
of entrapment is not available. One may not be solicited into soliciting. He is either the solicitor 
or the solicitee. If the former, he may not be the latter." Id. at 221. 
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C. The True Inducement Problem: A Jury Question 
In the vast majority of cases the inducement issue is submitted as 
a jury issue because the defendant can usually offer fairly substantial 
evidence of government involvement, and the prosecution does not 
normally contest such evidence. 74 The traditional test for determining 
when the inducement matter will be submitted as a jury issue was 
stated by the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Boccelli :75 "Entrap-
ment is a question for the jury unless there is no evidence to support 
the defense, or unless uncontradicted testimony makes it patently clear 
that an otherwise innocent person has been induced to commit the 
acts."76 A more recent statement of the principle can be found in 
United States v. Yater:17 
The question of entrapment goes to the basic guilt or 
innocence of the defendant .... "The concern is thus that the 
accused is not guilty, since he had no criminal intent not im-
planted by the government, rather than that he is guilty but 
may avoid the consequences of his criminal conduct because 
of the government's undue inducement." Because entrap-
ment involves the basic determination of guilt or innocence, 
it is a jury issue . . .. 78 
Several cases illustrate the manner in which the inducement issue 
can be raised before the jury. In State v. Jones 79 the defendant became 
involved in a scheme devised by government agents to secure a convic-
tion of the defendant for violation of gun control laws. The agents 
worked closely with the defendant and deceived him with respect to 
their ultimate goal. In response to the defense argument that such 
conduct established .entrapment as a matter of law, the court con-
cluded that "[a]s distasteful as this may be, it is a legitimate weapon in 
the arsenal of law enforcement. The law does not mandate a frank, 
forthright or even honest approach when seeking to ferret out criminal 
activity."80 The court stressed that the record be made clear that gov-
74. The true battleground in most of these cases deals with predisposition. See infra text 
accompanying notes 88-126. 
75. 105 Ariz. 495, 467 P.2d 740 (1970). 
76. /d. at 497, 467 P.2d at 742 (citation omitted). There must exist some doubt today as to 
the court's ultimate holding in Boccelli concerning a finding of entmpment due to the govern-
ment's involvement in manufacturing the drugs and providing a buyer. See the discussion in the 
Hampton case in Marcus, The Development of Entrapment Law, 33 WAYNE ST. L. REV. 5 
(1987). 
77. 756 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 225 (1985). 
78. /d. at 1062 (quoting United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203, 210 (5th Cir. 1984) (en 
bane)). 
79. 598 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn. 1980). 
80. /d. at 212. 
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ernment agents were closely involved with the defendant's activities, 
making false and fraudulent representations, but that the evidence was 
not sufficient to show, as a matter of law, that he had been induced 
into committing the crime. 81 
In United States v. Knight 82 the defendant waived his right to a 
jury trial and was brought before the judge for possession and transfer 
of a "sawed-off, shotgun. 83 The defendant's primary evidence with 
respect to inducement was his testimony that he offered to sell the 
weapon in an "unsawed-off" state, but the government agent insisted 
that he would buy the weapon only if the barrel of it was shortened to 
a length that was prohibited by law. The defendant agreed to saw the 
barrel off only on the second meeting, after first having refused the 
government request to saw it off. He stated that he ultimately sawed 
the barrel off because he needed the money. The trial judge held that 
this evidence was sufficient to demonstrate government inducement 
under any of the applicable standards. The court then focused its at-
tention on the question of the predisposition of the defendant to com-
mit the offense. The court ultimately had doubts as to the defendant's 
predisposition at the time of the initial contact between him and the 
government and found the defendant not guilty.84 
Another good illustration of the way in which the inducement 
issue usually comes before the trier of fact can be found in United 
States v. Kelly, 85 another case involving one of the numerous Abscam 
prosecutions. The defendant argued that because he had been prom-
ised such a large sum of money there was no triable issue concerning 
inducement. His position was that inducement had been shown as a 
matter of law because the offer of such a large sum of money was 
government conduct that "could have caused an undisposed person to 
commit a crime."86 The court strongly rejected this argument: 
Reasonable persons could differ as to whether the amount of 
money offered Kelly and the manner in which the offer un-
folded went beyond merely offering Kelly an opportunity to 
commit a crime. The question of how a reasonable person 
81. Id. at 220. 
82. 604 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Ohio 1985). 
83. In violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), (e) and 5871 (1982). 
84. The judge relied heavily on the fact that it took two meetings for the defendant to be 
persuaded to saw off the barrel and the government's knowledge of the defendant's precarious 
financial condition. There appeared to be genuine reluctance on the part of the defendant which 
was only overcome by a relationship purposely established by the government. 604 F. Supp. at 
987. 
85. 748 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
86. Id. at 697. 
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would have reacted is a quintessential jury issue, and the evi-
dence here is not so unequivocal to mandate one conclusion 
or another.87 
D. Proving Predisposition 
The subjective test enunciated by the Supreme Court is based 
upon two factors: inducement and predisposition. As has been noted 
previously, however, the predisposition aspect is the major concern 
and has been the chief source of litigation in the area. The very nature 
of the subjective test necessitates a showing of predisposition. As 
Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out in the Russell case: 
[E]ntrapment is a relatively limited defense. It is rooted, not 
in any authority of the Judicial Branch to dismiss prosecu-
tions for what it feels to have been "overzealous law enforce-
ment," but instead in the notion that Congress could not 
have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has 
committed all the elements of a proscribed offense but was 
induced to commit them by the Government. 88 
When the question is whether the defendant committed the crime 
solely because of inducement by the government, the inquiry naturally 
focuses on the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the induce-
ment. The Supreme Court took this position in its first major entrap-
ment decision, Sorrells v. United States : 
The defense is available, not in the view that the accused 
though guilty may go free, but that the government cannot 
be permitted to contend that he is guilty of a crime where the 
government officials are the instigators of his conduct. The 
federal courts in sustaining the defense in such circum-
stances have proceeded in the view that the defendant is not 
guilty.89 
The "controlling question [thus is] whether the defendant is a 
person otherwise innocent .... " 90 Given that reliance on the defend-
ant's state of mind is the controlling question, it is impossible for the 
defendant to complain when the evidence in the case centers on prov-
ing his predisposition: 
68 
[I]f the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he 
cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry 
into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that 
issue. If in consequence he suffers a disadvantage, he has 
87. Id. at 698 (footnotes omitted). 
88. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973). 
89. 287 u.s. 435, 452 (1932). 
90. Id. at 451. 
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brought it upon himself by reason of the nature of the 
defense.91 
In applying the predisposition analysis, courts have stated the 
problem in a variety of ways. The Seventh Circuit in United States v. 
Fields 92 noted that predisposition "refers to whether the defendant 
had a readiness and willingness to commit the offenses charged, or 
whether the government implanted in the mind of an innocent person 
the disposition to commit the offense."93 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit 
commented that the issue is whether the defendant exhibited "a pre-
disposition to commit an offense, [because] the governmental partici-
pation in the commission of an offense by itself cannot be the basis of 
an entrapment defense."94 
The state courts have followed a similar pattern. In State v. 
Duncan 95 the court stated that entrapment is "the inducement of one 
to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere purpose of 
instituting a criminal prosecution against him."96 One Ohio court put 
the matter rather neatly: 
Where the criminal design for an offense originates with gov-
ernment agents and they implant in the mind of an innocent 
person the disposition to commit the act and induce its com-
mission, the defendant has been entrapped; likewise, there is 
no entrapment when an agent merely affords the opportunity 
for the offense and the accused had a predisposition to com-
mit the offense. 97 
While the subjective test is simply stated, it is still the case that 
"[p]redisposition is necessarily a nebulous concept .... "98 Numerous 
91. /d. at 451-52. 
92. 689 F.2d 122 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1089 (1982). 
93. /d. at 124 (quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442). 
94. United States v. Leja, 563 F.2d 244, 245 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074 
(1978). 
95. 75 N.C. App. 23, 330 S.E.2d 481 (1985). 
96. /d., 330 S.E.2d at 487 (quoting State v. Stanley, 288 N.C. 19, 27, 215 S.E.2d 589, 594 
(1975)). The court quoted State v. Walker, 295 N.C. 510, 513, 246 S.E.2d 748, 749-50 (1978), to 
elaborate on the point: 
The defense of entrapment consists of two elements: (1) acts of persuasion, trickery or 
fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or their agents to induce a defendant to 
commit a crime, (2) when the criminal design originated in the minds of the govern-
ment officials, rather than with the innocent defendant, such that the crime is the prod-
uct of the creative activity of the law enforcement authorities. 
/d. (citations omitted). 
97. State v. Woods, 20 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 484 N.E.2d 773, 774 (Ct. C.P. 1984). 
98. United States v. Hunt, 749 F.2d 1078, 1085 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3479 
(1985). The court explained the difficult nature of the predisposition test: 
The standard jury instruction on entrapment, as given here, asks whether the de-
fendant was "ready and willing" to commit crimes such as charged whenever the op-
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statutes have been adopted to provide guidance in the area of proving 
predisposition. The Missouri statute is fairly typical: 
An "entrapment" is perpetuated [sic] if a law enforcement 
officer or a person acting in cooperation with such an officer, 
for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of 
an offense, solicits, encourages or otherwise induces another 
person to engage in conduct when he was not ready and will-
ing to engage in such conduct.99 
Both federal and state courts have followed the standard rule 
with respect to proving predisposition. Where the defendant has 
presented sufficient evidence of inducement by government authori-
ties, 100 "the burden rests on the government to overcome an entrap-
ment defense." 101 The court in United States v. Gunter 102 explained 
the matter even more clearly: "Once a defendant accomplishes this 
[evidence of inducement], the burden shifts to the Government to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed 
or that there was no Government inducement."103 
The predisposition issue is almost always a question of fact for the 
jury. In essence the question centers on the individual's state of mind 
at the time of the government inducement, a matter naturally given to 
the trier of fact. 104 The question of predisposition will not be an issue 
portunity was afforded. This is hardly more illuminating than the general notion of 
predisposition itself, given that one's willingness to commit a crime would necessarily 
depend on the level of inducement offered and the circumstances created by govern-
ment agents. "Persistent offers, exorbitant amounts of money, and appeals to emotion 
or civic duty may seduce a person of ordinary firmness into a compromising position." 
It is simply naive to suppose that public officials, or other defendants, can be neatly 
divided between the pure of heart and those with a "criminal" outlook. 
ld. at n.9 (citations omitted) (quoting Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of En-
trapment, 91 YALE L.J. 1565, 1584 (1982). 
99. Mo. REv. STAT. § 562.066.2 (1978). The court in State v. Arnold, 676 S.W.2d 61, 62 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984) explored the rationale for the statute: 
[W]hen the criminal intent originates with the officer and the defendant is lured or 
induced into the commission of a crime he was not ready and willing to engage in, then, 
as a general rule an entrapment has occurred and no conviction may be had. On the 
other hand, if the criminal intent originates in the mind of the defendant, it is no de-
fense to the charge that an opportunity is furnished or that an officer aids in the com-
mission of the crime. 
100. On the question of the sufficiency of the evidence regarding inducement, see supra text 
accompanying notes 35-53. 
101. Hunt, 749 F.2d at 1085. 
102. 741 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1984). 
103. /d. at 153. See also United States v. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d 866, 871-72 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 106 S. Ct. 99 (1985). 
104. The court in Hunt noted that the predisposition concept was a nebulous one and that 
the instructions regarding predisposition were based upon the naive view that defendants could 
be divided between "the pure of heart and those with a 'criminal' outlook." The court found that 
the situation thus called for jucy determinations generally. "As it would appear, however, to be 
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for the jury when either "the undisputed facts establish the entrap-
ment defense as a matter of law, ... or where the evidence is simply 
insufficient to submit the issue to the jury .... " 105 
One case in which the "undisputed evidence demonstrate[d] a 
clear absence of predisposition"106 was Sherman v. United States. 107 
The issue of predisposition, therefore, was not submitted to the jury. 
The Sherman Court concluded from the undisputed testimony of the 
government's own witness that the defendant was induced to sell 
drugs by the government agent and that he would not have otherwise 
attempted to do so. The government agent had made persistent re-
quests of the defendant and had finally succeeded in overbearing the 
defendant's will. The Supreme Court decided that entrapment had oc-
curred because the criminal act of the defendant was the product of 
the creative activity of a law enforcement agent. 108 
A case in which "the evidence [was] plainly insufficient as a mat-
ter of law" 109 to present the predisposition issue as a question of fact 
for the jury was United States v. Armocida. 110 The defendant in 
Armocida was convicted of distributing and conspiring to distribute 
heroin. The government agent contacted the defendant and offered to 
provide him with quinine if the defendant could provide heroin in re-
turn. Although it took several months of discussion before the defend-
ant provided this heroin, the evidence was clear that "the delay was 
not due to any reluctance on [the defendant's] part. Rather, [the de-
fendant] attributed the delay entirely to problems getting heroin from 
'his people.' " 111 The court concluded that there was simply no evi-
dence negating the propensity of the defendant's part to sell the her-
oin; he had offered no affirmative evidence demonstrating a lack of 
intent to sell the narcotics. 
impossible to formulate a more coherent definition of predisposition consistent with the Supreme 
Court's decisions, the whole matter is best left to the discretion of juries, constrained only per-
haps in the use of unreliable character evidence .... " 749 F.2d at 1085 n.9. 
105. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 597 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 
(1982). 
106. United States v. Knight, 604 F. Supp. 984, 986 (S.D. Ohio 1985). 
107. 356 u.s. 369 (1958). 
108. Id. at 372 (citing Sa"e//s, 287 U.S. at 441, 451). The Court was willing to find entrap-
ment as a matter of law because they were "not choosing between conflicting witnesses, nor 
judging credibility .... Aside from recalling ... the Government's witness, the defense called no 
witnesses. [They reached their] conclusion from the undisputed testimony of the prosecution's 
witnesses. 356 U.S. at 373. 
109. Hunt, 749 F.2d at 1085. 
110. 515 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1975). 
111. Id. at 56. 
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[T]he evidence suggests that he was completely willing to 
provide it once he could obtain it from "his people." [The 
defendant] could have presented evidence negating propen-
sity either through his own testimony, by cross-examining · 
Government witnesses or by any other means, but he failed 
to do so. At most, the evidence to which [the defendant] 
directs us falls short of creating a jury question on the issue 
of propensity. 112 
Because the primary focus in entrapment cases is on the defend-
ant's predisposition to commit the crime, and not on the actions of the 
government, 113 some courts today follow what has been labeled the 
"unitary standard."114 In these courts, the defendant must offer suffi-
cient evidence of the inducement and "at least suggest that the defend-
ant was initially unwilling to commit the crime, or that Government 
involvement planted the criminal design in the defendant's mind."m 
Thus, in the case in which the defendant is not apparently reluctant to 
engage in the criminal conduct, the mere "fact that a Government 
informant made the initial contact is overshadowed by [defendant's] 
uninduced willingness to conclude a deal."116 
Most courts, however, have not moved to the unitary standard of 
requiring defense evidence on both inducement and lack of predisposi-
tion. Instead, the standard rule has been that if the defendant offers 
adequate evidence of inducement, the burden then shifts to the govern-
ment to prove lack of predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt. 117 
Many courts hold that if the defendant "has presented substantial evi-
dence of entrapment, the State must produce evidence to show the 
defendant's predisposition to commit the crime. Failure to do so sub-
jects the State to the adverse direction of a judgment of acquitta1." 118 
Periodically, courts applying the subjective test have held that 
certain types of government conduct constitute entrapment, wholly 
apart from consideration of the evidence regarding predisposition. 
112. /d. (citation omitted). 
113. United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044 
(1982). 
114. For a detailed discussion of the standard, see Marcus, supra note 2, at 203. 
115. Fleishman, 684 F.2d at 1342. 
116. /d. at 1343. 
117. See United States v. Sarmiento, 786 F.2d 665, 667 (5th Cir. 1986). 
118. State v. Devine, 554 S.W.2d 442, 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). See also State v. Jones, 416 
A.2d 676, 684 (R.I. 1980): 
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When the defendant introduces sufficient evidence of inducement to raise the question 
of entrapment but the state adduces no evidence of predisposition in rebuttal, the trial 
justice must find as a matter of law that entrapment has occurred. However, if the state 
introduces evidence of defendant's predisposition, the jury must resolve the question of 
entrapment. 
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Therefore, if a certain kind of inducement is demonstrated in these 
courts, the government will not be given an opportunity to show pre-
disposition because the defendant has sustained the entire burden with 
respect to entrapment. 119 Perhaps the now discredited opinion in 
United States v. Bueno 120 best illustrates a court's application of this 
rule. In Bueno a government agent provided the defendant with her-
oin, and the defendant then sold this heroin to another government 
agent. The court stated: "The story takes on the element of the gov-
ernment buying heroin from itself, through an intermediary, the de-
fendant, and then charging him with the crime."121 
The court in Bueno held that if this evidence were to be believed 
the defendant could not, as a matter of law, be convicted of a drug 
offense. 122 This reasoning was overwhelmingly rejected by the United 
States Supreme Court in Hampton v. United States. 123 The facts of 
Hampton were similar to those in Bueno. However, the defense in 
Hampton requested a specific instruction dealing with the issue: 
If you find that the defendant's sales of narcotics were 
sales of narcotics supplied to him by an informer in the em-
ploy of or acting on behalf of the government, then you must 
acquit the defendant because the law as a matter of policy 
forbids his conviction in such a case. 
Furthermore, under this particular defense, you need 
not consider the predisposition of the defendant to commit 
the offense charged, because if the governmental involvement 
through its informer reached the point that I have just de-
fined in your own minds, then the predisposition of the de-
fendant would not matter. 124 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority of the Court, rejected 
this position. Relying on the traditional predisposition test, the Court 
noted that the defendant had not been entrapped as a matter of law 
and that none of his constitutional rights had been violated:125 
119. It has also been suggested that "[t]he greater the inducement, the heavier the govern-
ment's burden of proving predisposition." Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 619-20 (Aldisart, J., dissenting). 
See also United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504, 511 (3d Cir. 1973). 
120. 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973). 
121. Id. at 905. 
122. Id. 
123. 425 u.s. 484 (1976). 
124. /d. at 488 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 9). 
125. The court relied principally on the due process argument of the defendant. 
The limitations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment come into play 
only when the Government activity in question violates some protected right of the 
defendant. . . . But the police conduct here no more deprived defendant of any right 
secured to him by the United States Constitution than did the police conduct in Russell 
deprive Russell of any rights. 
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[T]he statutory defense of entrapment was not available 
where it was conceded that a Government agent supplied a 
necessary ingredient in the manufacture of an illicit drug .... 
[T]he entrapment defense "focus[es] on the intent or predis-
position of the defendant to commit the crime," rather than 
upon the conduct of the Government's agents. We ruled out 
the possibility that the defense of entrapment could ever be 
based upon governmental misconduct in a case, such as this 
one, where the predisposition of the defendant to commit the 
crime was established. 126 
III. THE PROOF PRINCIPLES STATED: TOTALITY OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
For some time the courts provided little assistance to lawyers and 
trial judges concerning the kind of evidence or the principles of appli-
cation to be used in demonstrating predisposition. The following 
statement taken from an opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court was 
typical: 
Predisposition may be established by evidence of prior 
crimes of a similar character . . . or by evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, that the accused was ready and willing to en-
gage in the illegal conduct in question. Evidence of the de-
fendant's reputation bears upon the issue. A finding of 
predisposition should be based on the totality of the 
circumstances." 127 
Although the courts have attempted to use this "totality of cir-
cumstances" approach, more recently they have identified specific fac-
tors to be weighed by both trial judges and juries. The court in United 
States v. Navarro 128 began its discussion of this area by noting the 
difficulty in "divining" a defendant's predisposition once the crime has 
been committed.129 It then enunciated guidelines which it thought 
would be helpful in determining the defendant's state of mind: 
(1) the character or reputation of the defendant; 
(2) whether the suggestion of criminal activity was origi-
nally made by the Government; 
Id. at 490-91 (emphasis in original). 
126. Id. at 488-89 (quoting Russel/, 411 U.S. at 429). 
127. State v. Jones, 598 S.W.2d 209, 220 (Tenn. 1980). See generally United States v. Ro-
land, 748 F.2d 1321, 1327 (2d Cir. 1984). 
128. 737 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1020 (1984). 
129. Id. at 635. The court cited United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 
1983) and United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd on other 
grounds, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982), to define "predisposition" as 
the defendant's state of mind before exposure to government agents. 
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(3) whether the defendant was engaged in criminal activity 
for a profit; 
(4) whether the defendant evidenced reluctance to commit 
the offense, overcome by Government persuasion; 
(5) the nature of the inducement or persuasion offered by 
the Government.130 
These guidelines have been widely employed by courts through-
out the country.131 However, some courts have gone beyond the prin-
ciples stated in Navarro in their attempts to identify the type of 
evidence that should be considered by the trier of fact. 132 The court in 
United States v. Dian 133 identified a total of ten factors to be consid-
ered in determining predisposition: 
(1) whether the defendant readily responded to the induce-
ment offered; 
(2) the circumstances surrounding the illegal conduct; 
(3) the state of mind of a defendant before government 
agents make any suggestion that he shall commit a 
crime; 
( 4) whether the defendant was engaged in an existing 
course of conduct similar to the crime for which he is 
charged; 
(5) whether the defendant had already formed the "design" 
to commit the crime for which he is charged; 
(6) the defendant's reputation; 
(7) the conduct of the defendant during the negotiations 
with the undercover agent; 
(8) whether the defendant has refused to commit similar 
acts on other occasions; 
(9) the nature of the crime charged; 
(10) the degree of coercion present in the instigation law of-
ficers have contributed to the transaction relative to the 
defendant's criminal background. 134 
130. Id. (quoting United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191, 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 
S.Ct. 2683 (1984)). 
131. See United States v. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d 866, 871 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 99 
(1985); United States v. Busby, 780 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Knight, 604 
F. Supp. 984, 987 (S.D. Ohio 1985). 
132. Such a conclusion may be in response to the statement of several judges that an "appar-
ent willingness" on the part of the defendant may not be sufficient. See, e.g., United States v. 
Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir. 1933) ("[W]e do not wish to commit ourselves to the doc-
trine that mere readiness is enough ... /'). 
133. 762 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 2216 (1986). 
134. Id. at 687-88 (citations omitted). 
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A. The Time Factor 
Usually, the time factor concerning the defendant's state of mind 
does not present a major difficulty because "the time of [the govern-
ment] contact is usually simultaneous with, or very close to, the time 
the crime is committed."135 Hence, it is not surprising that many 
courts give only slight consideration to the time element in determin-
ing predisposition. Indeed, the standard rule is that "predisposition 
refers to the state of mind of a defendant before government agents 
make any suggestion that he should commit a crime."136 Stated an-
other way, predisposition refers to "the defendant's state of mind and 
inclinations before his initial exposure to government agents." 137 
In other cases, however, the matter is more complex and far more 
significant. For example, in United States v. Lasuita government 
agents contacted the defendant regarding the sale of marijuana. The 
defendant called the agent several times after that initial contact to 
request additional information. Three weeks later the defendant 
agreed to purchase the marijuana and did so. The trial judge in-
structed the jury that the key issue in the case was whether the defend-
ant had "a prior intent or a predisposition to commit the offense ... or 
was the Defendant induced by law enforcement officers and their 
agents to commit the offense when he had no prior intent or disposi-
tion to do so?"138 After deliberating for a while the jury returned with 
a question for the court: "Does the government have to prove, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that prior to contact with the U.S. Government or 
its agents, that the Defendant was ready and/or willing to enter into 
an illegal act?" (emphasis added by the court). 139 The trial judge an-
swered the question, "No." 
The Sixth Circuit considered Lasuita on appeal and found that 
the trial court's negative response meant, in essence, that the jury had 
been informed that the government did not have to prove that the 
defendant was willing to commit the crime prior to contact with the 
government agents. 140 Therefore, the real question for the court was 
whether the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime 
would have to exist at the time of his contact with the agents, or '~ust 
135. United States v. Lasuita, 752 F.2d 249, 254 (6th Cir. 1985). 
136. United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 618 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007 
(1983). 
137. United States v. Iannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd on other 
grounds, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982). 
138. 752 F.2d at 252. 
139. Id. 
140. ld. at 253. 
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before committing the offense," which was three weeks after the initial 
contact. 141 The court explored case decisions in the area and decided 
that the case law suggested, although it did not expressly state, that 
the government's burden related to the defendant's state of mind at the 
time of the initial contact, rather than to any disposition which might 
thereafter develop: 
[T]he prosecution must show that the defendant was willing 
to commit the offense at the time when the government 
agents initially contacted the defendant to propose the 
wrongful conduct. The agents may not take a defendant 
who is initially truly unwilling to commit the offense and 
then induce him to become a criminal. 142 
The negative response of the Lasuita trial court to the jury's question 
may have led the jurors to conclude that it made no difference that the 
defendant had no criminal predisposition at the time of the govern-
ment contact. The appellate court found, therefore, that the trial 
judge "should have advised the jury that the predisposition has to exist 
at the time of the initial contact."143 The defendant's conviction was 
reversed. 
The Supreme Court of Delaware reached a different conclusion 
regarding the time element in Harrison v. State. 144 The defendant in 
Harrison was charged with taking drugs into a state prison. Her argu-
ment was that she was not predisposed to commit the crime at the 
time of the initial government contact but developed this state of mind 
only after a series of discussions with a police officer. The court recog-
nized that most judges had focused their attention on the state of mind 
of the defendant "just before a government agent enlisted his partici-
pation in the venture."145 The Harrison court was troubled, however, 
by the focus being "wholly on the issue of predisposition to the time 
period 'just before' the police solicited defendant to participate in the 
criminal scheme."146 
The application of the rule ... would provide an entrapment 
defense to every individual who establishes an unblemished 
personal record prior to being approached to commit a 
crime. Furthermore, it is often the case that "the sole proof 
of predisposition consists of evidence as to what the defend-
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 254. 
144. 442 A.2d 1377 (Del. 1982). 
145. Id. at 1385 (quoting United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975)). 
146. Id. at 1386. 
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ant did on the occasion in question, in response to the over-
tures of the government agents.'*7 
Thus, the Harrison court refused to rely exclusively on consideration 
of the time period before the initial contact: 
[T]he interval between the solicitation and the actual com-
mission of the offense is highly significant on the question of 
predisposition because it is within that time period that an 
accused may exhibit manifestations of his propensity for a 
specific crime which might not appear were it not for the 
State's initial enlistment of the defendant's participation. 
Thus, we hold that the point of reference for ascertain-
ing the predisposition of a defendant to commit a particular 
crime is the time period extending from just before the 
State's solicitation to just before the defendant's commission 
of the crime. 148 
B. Evidence of Predisposition: The Many Forms 
The government can offer a variety of types of evidence and testi-
mony to demonstrate predisposition on the part of the defendant. The 
types most commonly offered will be discussed below. 
1. Defendant's Conduct in Response to Inducement. -It has been 
said repeatedly in the entrapment area that perhaps the most revealing 
evidence of the defendant's state of mind is the manner in which he 
responds to the government inducement. A North Carolina court 
stated: "Predisposition may be shown by a defendant's ready compli-
ance, acquiescence in, or willingness to cooperate in the criminal plan 
where the police merely afford the defendant an opportunity to com-
mit the crime.'' 149 A few courts have stated the matter somewhat dif-
ferently. The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Andrews 150 noted 
that the defendant may prevail by showing "that he had not favorably 
received the government plan, and the government had had to 'push it' 
on him, . . . or that several attempts at setting up an illicit deal had 
failed and on at least one occasion he had directly refused to partici-
pate.''lSl The reasonable question, as still another court pointed out, 
is whether "the defendant expressed reluctance to commit the offense 
147. Id. (quoting Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. at 1191). 
148. Harrison, 442 A.2d at 1386. See United States v. Khubani, 791 F.2d 260, 264-65 (2d 
Cir. 1986). See also United States v. North, 746 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 
S. Ct. 1773 (1985). 
149. State v. Hageman, 307 N.C. 1, 31,296 S.E.2d 433,450 (1982). See also United States v. 
Meyers, 21 M.J. 1007, 1014 (A.C.M.R. 1986). 
150. 765 F.2d 1491 (lith Cir. 1985). 
151. Id. at 1499 (citations omitted). 
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which was overcome only by repeated government inducement or per-
suasion .... "152 
In a large number of entrapment cases there is only a showing of 
slight reluctance on the part of the defendant; therefore, the jury easily 
concludes that the entrapment defense has not been made. One illus-
trative case is United States v. Hunt 153 in which the defendant was a 
judge who was charged with accepting a pay-off. The facts demon-
strated that once the pay-off proposal was clarified to the judge, "no 
significant pressure or cajoling was required to secure the judge's as-
sent."154 Indeed, the evidence showed no real reluctance on the part 
of the judge: "[T]here was nothing to prevent him from breaking off 
relations at that point, yet he chose to proceed along the path to cor-
ruption."155 The evidence also showed that after the initial contact 
the defendant never demonstrated any desire to step back from the 
criminal activity, at least not until his name had been disclosed to the 
public.156 
Probably the most common case involving limited reluctance of 
the defendant in entrapment matters arises in drug prosecutions. A 
few cases are especially illustrative. In United States v. Perez-Leon 157 
the defendant, in response to an inquiry for a drug sale by the govern-
ment, initially indicated that he would not become involved. The tes-
timony demonstrated, however, that the reason for this "reluctance" 
was not a lack of interest in the transaction, but rather the nature of 
the defendant's own prior drug dealing experience. 158 The defendant 
later asked the government agent to leave his phone number and soon 
thereafter the defendant urged the government agent to continue the 
transaction. He demonstrated his knowledge and sophistication in the 
drug business by pointing out specifics with respect to prices, asking 
for a sample, and bragging that he was well known in the business. 
The defendant subsequently provided a large quantity of cocaine 
"within a few weeks time."159 The court had little difficulty conclud-
152. United States v. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d 866, 871 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 99 
(1985). But see People v. Boalbey, 143 Ill. App. 3d 362, 493 N.E.2d 369 (1969) where the court 
held that lack of reluctance was not enough. The government had to offer additional evidence as 
to predisposition. 
153. 749 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3479 (1985). 
154. Id. at 1086. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. 757 F.2d 866 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 99 (1985). 
158. The defendant's reluctance was explained by his comment, "I've been burned before." 
Id. at 872. 
159. Id. 
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ing that predisposition had been shown although the defendant ini-
tially had "expressed slight hesitation." The court stated that this 
hesitation was not sufficient to refute predisposition: 
[It] may have been caused by the very nature of drug trans-
actions in that a new buyer is usually checked and cross-
checked to the best of his supplier's ability. "Drug dealers 
are not known to call potential clients and solicit their busi-
ness, rather a dealer who expects to stay out of jail is careful 
about to whom he sells."160 
The defendant in State v. Duncan 161 had obtained cocaine for an 
undercover government officer on numerous occasions with speed and 
efficiency. The fact that there was no delay or hesitation on the de-
fendant's part was a major reason for the affirmation of his 
conviction. 162 
A showing of general reluctance will constitute powerful proof of 
an unpredisposed mind, and the government under such circum-
stances will experience difficulty in prevailing on the predisposition is-
sue. Such circumstances are found in United States v. Knight. 163 The 
defendant in Knight was convicted of transferring a "sawed-off" shot-
gun. 164 The testimony revealed that the defendant was willing to sell a 
shotgun with a legal barrel length to the government agent. The 
agent, however, claimed that he would purchase the gun only if the 
barrel were "sawed-off." Defendant clearly indicated reluctance to 
sell such a weapon. This reluctance, however, was "overcome by re-
peated Government inducements and the Defendant's precarious fi-
nancial condition. Furthermore, the evidence also revealed that the 
Defendant did not cut the barrel until repeated Government impor-
tuning overcame his reluctance to do so."165 After reviewing this evi-
dence, the trial court held that reasonable doubt existed as to 
predisposition and found the defendant innocent of the charges. 
2. The Defendant's Ability to Perform the Illegal Acts.-The ideal 
hypothetical case for defense counsel is one in which government 
agents first contact the defendant and ask him to sell them illegal nar-
cotics for a very high price. The defendant agrees to do so and then 
spends a great deal of time contacting numerous individuals before he 
is able to find his supplier. The sale to the government agent is then 
160. ld. (quoting United States v. Gunter, 741 F.2d 151, 154 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
161. 75 N.C. App. 38, 330 S.E.2d 481 (1985). 
162. Id. at 44, 330 S.E.2d at 487. See also United States v. Busby, 780 F.2d 804, 808 (9th 
Cir. 1986); Fleishman, 684 F.2d at 1343. 
163. 604 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Ohio 1985). 
164. In violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861 (d), (e) and § 5871 (Supp. III 1985). 
165. 604 F. Supp. at 987. 
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finalized after a fair amount of time, and the defendant is arrested. 
This sequence of events may well demonstrate that the defendant was 
not predisposed to commit the crime; instead, the idea for the crime 
was implanted in his mind by government inducement. Considering 
the time lags and the defendant's inability to perform the illegal act 
quickly, the jury may well find that no predisposition has been shown. 
Unfortunately for defense counsel, however, most cases that raise the 
issue involve precisely the opposite fact pattern, one in which the de-
fendant is ready, willing and quite able to perform the illegal act on 
relatively short notice. 
The well-known case of United States v. Gunter 166 is one of the 
numerous cases on this issue. The defendants in Gunter were con-
victed of various narcotics offenses. Within a relatively short period of 
time after having been contacted by government agents the defendants 
arrived at the apartment of one of the agents with a large quantity of 
cocaine. The defendants' ability to deliver this quantity of drugs with-
out any apparent difficulty was strong evidence on the issue of 
predisposition: 
Properly viewed, the evidence was sufficient to prove defend-
ants' predisposition. Defendants were able to acquire large 
quantities of cocaine on short notice and exhibited no reluc-
tance in selling the drug to [the police agent]. Defendants' 
ability to obtain ~he drug provided sufficient basis for the 
jury to infer that defendants were well versed in the drug 
trade. 167 
Indeed, the evidence in Gunter was made even more persuasive by the 
defendants' ability to obtain more cocaine than necessary for the po-
lice agent, leading to the inference that the agent was not the defend-
ants' only customer. As noted by the court, such actions are hardly 
those of "unwary innocents induced by the Government into selling 
drugs. Rather, defendants were ready and willing to sell cocaine and 
did so repeatedly."168 
3. The Defendant's Prior Background.-Focusing on the criminal 
background of the defendant is one of the standard methods of demon-
strating predisposition. This form of proof is rarely challenged. The 
underlying notion has always been that one who has committed the 
166. 741 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1984). 
167. Id. at 154. 
168. Id. See also Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d at 872 n.5, where the court found the evidence to be 
even more compelling than in Gunter. In the Gunter case the transactions took about two 
months. In Perez-Leon, the transaction took place less than two weeks later and the defendants 
supplied two kilograms of cocaine, or approximately 180 times the amount supplied by the de-
fendant in Gunter. See also Busby, 780 F.2d at 808. 
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criminal act before is more likely to be disposed to do so again. This 
notion comes dangerously close to the forbidden rule that prior crimes 
cannot be used to show "criminal propensity." Yet, the key issue in 
an entrapment case is precisely whether the accused, at the time of the 
government inducement, had a propensity to commit crimes of the 
nature charged; that is, whether he was predisposed to do so. 169 As 
one military court stated in a drug case, "Persons who possess and use 
a controlled substance are logically more likely to have considered dis-
tributing it than someone who has no familiarity with drugs.'mo 
Many serious problems arise from the use of prior acts of the 
defendant to prove his state of mind. The first relates to the need to 
distinguish between prior acts as opposed to prior crimes. The former 
involves far more dangerous possibilities than the latter. Perhaps the 
most extreme case of the government attempting to use prior un-
proved crimes to demonstrate state of mind occurred in State v. 
Jones. 111 The defendant in Jones was convicted of various drug of-
fenses. He claimed that he was entrapped by the government. The 
trial judge allowed the State to introduce evidence that the defendant 
had been indicted for delivering cocaine on another occasion. Indeed, 
the prosecutor questioned the defendant about this nineteen-month 
old indictment at some length. The appellate court strongly con-
demned this practice and noted that the evidence of the indictment 
"was probative of nothing more than official suspicion of Jones's 
wrongdoing."172 The defendant's conviction was vacated because it 
was very likely that the evidence of the prior indictment had seriously 
prejudiced the jury. 
The more common approach regarding prior acts of the defend-
ant is to focus on prior convictions of the defendant for similar of-
fenses. The argument is that these prior convictions show a 
predisposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime in 
question; therefore, any claim of entrapment is defeated. The issue 
arises in the federal courts most often under rule 404(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. 173 Rule 404(b) provides: 
169. United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 922 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966 
(1978). 
170. United States v. Bailey, 21 M.J. 244, 246 n.3 (C.M.A.), mandale issued, 22 M.J. 21 
(1986). 
171. 416 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1980). 
172. /d. at 683. 
173. Admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) must also satisfy Rule 403 dealing with preju-
dice to the defendant. The trial judge must determine that the probative value outweighs the 
potential for prejudice. In entrapment cases, however, the defense argument is somewhat prob· 
lematic as "the defendant cannot claim he is prejudiced by evidence indicating that at the rele-
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Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show that he ac-
ted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, in-
tent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
Though rule 404(b) does not refer explicitly to predisposition and 
entrapment, it is obviously a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion; 
only the use of such evidence to show propensity is prohibited, while 
other uses are not. Perhaps the leading decision on application of the 
Rule in the entrapment area is United States v. Burkley. 114 In that 
case Judge McGowan carefully explained that evidence of other 
crimes was not offered to show that the defendant acted in conformity 
with those crimes, "but that he was disposed to act in this manner."175 
The defendant had not been entrapped because he had the necessary 
predisposition. In a case such as Burkley there is little difficulty in 
demonstrating proper admissibility of evidence of other crimes under 
rule 404(b ). The other crimes previously committed by the defendant 
in Burkley related to large sales of narcotics, and the defendant was 
presently charged with selling narcotics. Moreover, the period of time 
between the two crimes was relatively short; it was only a matter of 
months. 176 
The real question in determining the applicability of rule 404(b) 
in the entrapment area is whether the prior crimes are truly relevant to 
proving the predisposition of the defendant with respect to the present 
crime. As stated in a nonentrapment matter, "[w]here the evidence 
sought to be introduced is an extrinsic offense, its relevance is a func-
tion of its similarity to the offense charged."177 In many prosecutions 
where entrapment concerns arise the crimes are truly of a similar na-
ture and few problems arise. The most common example is the case in 
which the defendant charged with the sale of drugs has prior convic-
tions for the purchase or sale of drugs. The problem is more acute in 
other types of cases. 
In United States v. Blankenship 178 the defendant was found guilty 
of unlawfully dealing in firearms. His only defense claim was one of 
vant time he had a propensity to commit crimes such as those he is accused of committing." 
Burkley, 591 F.2d at 922. 
174. 591 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966 (1978). 
175. Id. at 921 (emphasis in original). 
176. Though in Burkley the "other" crime was a subsequent offense, not a prior one. Id. 
177. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 
(1978). 
178. 775 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1985). 
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entrapment. At trial, tape recordings were offered in which the de-
fendant stated that he had also purchased stolen lawn equipment and 
lumber. The court began its inquiry by noting that the other criminal 
acts must "deal with conduct substantially similar and reasonably near 
in time to the offenses for which the defendant is being tried."179 The 
court conceded that the use of such other offenses "is a reliable 
method of proving the criminal predisposition needed to rebut the alle-
gation or inference of entrapment."180 The ultimate question, how-
ever, is whether these other crimes were "substantially similar to the 
offenses charged."181 The court decided that the other offenses, theft 
of property offenses, were not substantially similar to the crime of un-
lawful dealing in firearms and that they merely demonstrated the de-
fendant's general criminal character: 
Proof that the defendant has committed thefts in the past 
and is willing to share in the proceeds of a projected burglary 
has little if any probative value with respect to the issue of 
his predisposition to receive, possess, or deal in firearms. On 
the other hand, this evidence is fraught with danger of undue 
prejudice. Thus it fails both tests for the admissibility of 
other crimes evidence. 182 
A similar result was reached in State v. Burciaga 183 where the 
defendant was charged with attempted trafficking in stolen property. 
The State announced its intention to offer in evidence the defendant's 
prior conviction for theft in order to rebut the defense of entrap-
ment.184 The court began its analysis by repeating the limitation that 
the past conduct "must be of a sufficiently similar nature to the crime 
charged to show a predisposition to commit that crime."185 It stated 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that theft was 
not similar enough to trafficking in stolen property to demonstrate a 
predisposition. 
4. Other Evidence. -In most entrapment cases the predisposition 
question can be resolved by looking either to prior acts of the defend-
179. /d. at 739. The court also considered, and gave some weight to, the defense's argument 
that under Rule 403 the probative value was outweighed by the prejudice inherent in the admis-
sion of the evidence. 
180. /d. (quoting United States v. Salisbury, 662 F.2d 738, 741 (11th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
457 u.s. 1107 (1982)). 
181. /d. 
182. /d. at 740. 
183. 146 Ariz. 333, 705 P.2d 1384 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). 
184. Unlike some states, Arizona allows the entrapment matter (or at least the evidence re-
garding entrapment) to be offered and resolved pretrial in the form of a motion in limine. /d. at 
334, 705 P.2d at 1385. 
185. /d. at 1386-87 (emphasis in original). 
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ant, typically crimes, or to the manner in which the defendant re-
sponded to the government inducement. In some cases, however, such 
evidence is not dispositive and other forms of evidence are offered. 
C. Hearsay 
Predisposition analysis focuses primarily on the defendant and 
her personal background to determine "where [s]he sits on the contin-
uum between naive first offender and the street-wise habitue.":86 By 
sharpening this focus in entrapment cases, the courts have necessarily 
paid close attention to this individual and her activities prior to the 
contact by the government. Hence, it should not be surprising that in 
numerous cases statements are found to the effect that "[e]vidence of 
the defendant's reputation bears upon the [predisposition] issue."187 
Indeed, in some cases it is the defendant who may use this reputation 
testimony to her advantage. For example, the court in Shrader v. 
State 188 went well beyond usual entrapment law and held: "When the 
police target a specific individual for an undercover operation, they 
must have reasonable cause to believe that the individual is predis-
posed to commit the crime."189 Thus, two separate questions are in-
volved: (1) was there evidence of predisposition; and (2) did the 
government have reasonable cause to believe that the defendant pos-
sessed such predisposition. In Shrader the defendant argued that even 
though he had a reputation for having used drugs in the past, he had 
no previous criminal record and he had no reputation with respect to 
having sold narcotics in the past .. Consequently, the court held that 
the defendant had been entrapped as a matter of law. 190 
However, in most cases where reputation evidence is offered it is 
offered to bolster the government's claim that the defendant had the 
predisposition to commit the crime at the time the contact was made 
with him. Evidence regarding the defendant's reputation usually falls 
in one of three categories: (1) statements made by an informant to a 
police officer about the defendant's general reputation for being a 
criminal; (2) statements made to a police officer about specific criminal 
186. United States v. Townsend, 555 F.2d 152, 155 n.3 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 897 
(1977). 
187. State v. Jones, 598 S.W.2d 209, 220 (Tenn. 1980). 
188. 101 Nev. 499, 706 P.2d 834 (1985). 
189. /d. at 502, 706 P.2d at 836. 
190. /d. at 502, 504, 706 P.2d at 837, 839. 
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activities of the defendant; and (3) statements made by various sources 
about the defendant and recorded in police reports. 191 
When offered in evidence, such statements are hearsay because 
they are being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the 
matter asserted being that the defendant was predisposed.192 The fed-
eral courts vigilantly restricted the use of such hearsay statements to 
prove general reputation or specific instances of misconduct by the 
defendant. 193 Perhaps the leading opinion on this issue is United 
States v. Webster, 194 decided by the Fifth Circuit en bane. In rebuttal, 
the prosecution offered the testimony of a government agent that he 
had been told by an informant that the defendant had sold the inform-
ant illegal narcotics on several prior occasions. The government ar-
gued, among other points, that the evidence should be admissible 
because it directly refuted the defendant's claim that he lacked predis-
position. The court found that such hearsay was extremely prejudicial 
to the defendant and of little value to the trier of fact. 
Our creation of a rule that allows gross hearsay evi-
dence to be used to prove predisposition has resulted in the 
very evils that the rule against hearsay was designed to pre-
vent. The jury is free to believe the unsworn, unverified 
statements of government informants, sometimes unidenti-
fied, whose credibility is not subject to effective testing before 
the jury and whose motivations may be less than honorable. 
We are hard pressed to envision a situation where the dispar-
ity between the probative value and the prejudicial effect of 
evidence is greater. Finding inapplicable the exceptions to 
the rule against hearsay enumerated in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, we hold that hearsay evidence is never admissible 
for the purpose of proving the defendant's predisposition. 195 
Hearsay statements constituting evidence of reputation may be 
admissible in limited situations, even in federal courts where such evi-
191. These categories are taken from the United States v. Webster, 649 F.2d 346, 350 (5th 
Cir. 1981). 
192. The government has argued in some of these cases that the evidence of the defendant's 
reputation is not hearsay, being admissible to show "a pertinent trait of his character" under 
FED. R. EvlD. 404(a)(1). The courts have rather consistently rejected this position, finding that 
predisposition "is a state of mind, not a character trait." Webster, 649 F.2d at 350. 
193. Prior crimes which are offered under FED. R. Evm. 404(b) may be admitted for pur-
poses other than proof of predisposition. 
194. 649 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1981). 
195. /d. at 350 (footnotes omitted). See also Hunt, 749 F.2d at 1082 and the numerous other 
cases cited therein. The state cases, too, generally restrict hearsay. See, e.g., State v. Cox, 110 
Ariz. 603, 522 P.2d 29 (1974); Price v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1043, 1045-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); 
Bowser v. State, 50 Md. App. 363, 439 A.2d 1 (1981). But see United States v. Hawke, 505 F.2d 
817, 821-22 (lOth Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 978 (1975). 
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dence is rejected in the "run-of-the-mill entrapment case."196 The 
cases which raise the issue are ones in which the defendant argues that 
wholly apart from the subjective standard, the governmental miscon-
duct has been so egregious that the claim against him should be dis-
missed. As noted by the dissenters in Webster, the defendant's 
argument that the inducements of the government were too strong to 
resist was "an attacking defense that puts the prosecution on trial." 197 
Since it is "on trial," the government can respond to these attacks by 
discussing the defendant's reputation: 
Since the accused's attack, as here, necessarily impugns both 
the methods employed by the government and its motives 
and actions-implicating innocents in contrived crimes-the 
government often seeks to show that the accused was not an 
innocent at all. And since its motives and tactics are at-
tacked as well, it offers proof that its belief in the accused's 
predisposition was a reasonable one .... Necessarily, such a 
response will often rest in large part on hearsay: the reports 
on which the government acted in deciding to provide the 
opportunity. 198 
While this position did not prevail in Webster, 199 it did persuade 
the court in United States v. Hunt.Z00 Prior to trial the defendant in 
Hunt moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground of "outrageous 
government investigative conduct" that violated his due process 
rights. Part of this argument was based upon the claim that the gov-
ernment had "no evidence of the defendant's illegal conduct other 
than initiated by its own operatives."201 The court held that govern-
ment testimony regarding the defendant's reputation was proper in re-
sponse to the claim that the defendant had previously made. The 
court conceded that this evidence could not have been offered had the 
question of the government's basis for the investigation not been raised 
by the defense: 
It is evident that the defense simultaneously sought to de-
velop both its entrapment and due process claims, which are 
analytically distinct though relying to some extent on the 
196. This is the court's language in Webster, 649 F.2d at 351. 
197. Id. at 353 (Gee, J., dissenting). 
198. Id. (footnote omitted). 
199. The majority in Webster did allow such evidence to be offered, but in a much narrower 
context than would have been allowed either by the majority in Hunt or by the dissenters in 
Webster. The court indicated that "governmental good faith, motive, and reasonableness" would 
be at issue in entrapment cases under the objective standard, but only in "rare circumstances." 
649 F.2d at 351. 
200. 749 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. deni'ed, 105 S. Ct. 3479 (1985). 
201. Id. at 1083. 
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same facts. Though only the entrapment claim was for the 
jury to resolve, the government was nevertheless entitled to 
develop its rebuttal to the due process theory as well, once 
the defense called the government's conduct into question. 
Having "opened the door" the defendant may not be heard 
to complain of testimony which proved adverse to his posi-
tion that the government had no reason to investigate him. 202 
D. Expert Testimony 
The question of expert testimony in entrapment cases rarely 
arises. In advancing an entrapment defense, the defendant in State v. 
Woods 203 made a pretrial motion for permission to introduce psychiat-
ric testimony as to traits which were relevant to the predisposition 
element of entrapment. 204 Although the matter was complicated 
somewhat by the fact that Ohio does not recognize the claim of dimin-
ished capacity, the court nevertheless allowed the testimony to be ad-
mitted. The opinion noted that Ohio had adopted the subjective test 
of entrapment as an affirmative defense. 205 The court concluded that 
expert psychiatric testimony as to the defendant's "susceptibility to 
influence may be relevant to an entrapment defense and an expert's 
opinion on the susceptibility issue may aid the jury in its determina-
tion of critical issues of inducement and predisposition .... "206 Be-
cause the basic issue in entrapment deals with the "origin of the 
criminal intent," testimony concerning the defendant's susceptibility 
to inducement was an important factor which should be viewed by the 
trier of fact.207 The major restriction the court placed on this testi-
mony208 was that the expert could not testify concerning "the actions 
of the government agents or their effect upon the defendant's suscepti-
bility nor as to the ultimate issue of the existence of entrapment," all 
of which was viewed as invading the province of the jury.209 
/d. 
202. /d. at 1084. 
203. 20 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 484 N.E.2d 773 (Ct. C.P. 1984). 
204. 484 N.E.2d at 774. 
205. The court stated the Ohio subjective test as follows: 
Where the criminal design for an offense originates with government agents and an 
implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the act and induce 
its commission, the defendant has been entrapped; likewise, there is no entrapment 
when an agent merely affords the opportunity for the offense and the accused had a 
predisposition to commit the offense. 
206. /d. 
207. /d. at 775. 
208. Following the principle of the Third Circuit in United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512 (3d 
Cir. 1981). 
209. 484 N.E.2d at 775. 
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E. Subsequent Acts 
The evidence in cases raising the predisposition issue usually fo-
cuses on conduct of the defendant prior to the government contact, or 
conduct of the defendant that occurs simultaneously with the contact 
and in response to it. In some cases, however, acts or statements of 
the defendant after the initial contact by the government may be rele-
vant to show predisposition. The courts have consistently admitted 
such evidence of "post-crime actions."210 The real issue in these cases 
is whether these subsequent acts are relevant to the question of predis-
position. The relevance issue with respect to subsequent acts is more 
difficult than it is with prior acts because the focus is on the predisposi-
tion of the defendant, as opposed to the state of mind which may de-
velop after the government takes the challenged actions. Nevertheless, 
there are cases in which such later conduct may well be relevant. The 
two most famous cases in the area demonstrate different fact patterns 
in which similar principles were applied. 
United States v. Jannotti 211 was one of the famous Abscam cases. 
One aspect of the case involved the defendant Criden, a Philadelphia 
attorney who allegedly gave money to Schwartz, the president of the 
Philadelphia City Council, in return for Schwartz's introducing him to 
Iannotti, the majority leader of the City Council. Payment of money 
to this fund, a "finders fee,"212 was made after it had been put forth by 
the government agents. The court held that the acceptance of this 
payment could be considered by the jury on the question of predisposi-
tion, even though it occurred after the initial contact of the govern-
ment, because it would tend to "demonstrate that he was disposed to 
wrongdoing."213 Similarly, in United States v. Jenkins,214 a case in-
volving the distribution of heroin, the court admitted evidence of a 
subsequent act on the issue of predisposition. The defendant claimed 
that he was an unwary and innocent person who had been entrapped 
by the government into committing the narcotics offense. The defend-
ant had no prior conviction, there was no evidence that he had a repu-
tation as a dealer in narcotics, and there was no evidence that he had 
made any prior sales. Nevertheless, willingness to engage in criminal 
210. See, e.g., United States v. Roland, 748 F.2d 1321, 1327 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Meyers, 21 M.J. 1007, 1015 (A.C.M.R. 1986); Harrison v. State, 442 A.2d 1377, 1386 n.8 (Del. 
1982). 
211. 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982). 
212. These are the words of the court. Id. at 605. 
213. Id. 
214. 480 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 913 (1973). 
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conduct was demonstrated by a statement he made after the sale: "[l]f 
you need more, I'll be here."215 
As both of these cases demonstrate, subsequent actions and state-
ments may be relevant on the issue of predisposition and, under such 
circumstances, the evidence is properly admissible. However, the cen-
tral entrapment issue does not change: "[P]redisposition refers to the 
state of a mind of a defendant before government agents make any 
suggestion that he should commit a crime."216 The determinative 
question on the admissibility of evidence of subsequent acts and state-
ments will be whether the evidence helps the jury in assessing the de-
fendant's prior state of mind regarding particular criminal activity.217 
IV. THE PRINCIPLES APPLIED 
The preceding sections of this Article have focused upon the gen-
eral principles used in determining predisposition. In this final sec-
tion, these principles will be applied so as to offer some idea of the way 
in which prosecutions are actually resolved on this issue. 
A. Where Predisposition Is Shown 
"The defense of entrapment focuses upon whether the Govern-
ment's actions implanted the criminal design in the mind of an other-
wise unpredisposed person."218 In many cases there is little doubt that 
the totality of the evidence presented by the state shows predisposition 
to the satisfaction of all. Some illustrative cases are those in which the 
defendant eagerly, and with little reluctance, participates in the crimi-
nal venture. As stated earlier, the defendant in United States v. Perez-
Leon/19 was convicted for various narcotics offenses despite his claim 
that he was not predisposed. The appellate court noted that the de-
fendant's initial "reluctance" had little to do with predisposition. In-
stead, this reluctance was due to his prior bad drug dealing experience 
as reflected in the defendant's comment, "I've been burned before. "220 
The defendant asked the government agent to leave his phone number, 
and then urged the government agent to go forward with the drug 
215. /d. at 1200. 
216. United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 618 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007 
(1983). 
217. See generally United States v. Silvestri, 719 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1983) (yet another Ab-
scam case). 
218. United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191, 1196 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, lOS S. Ct. 438 
(1984). 
219. 757 F.2d 866 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 99 (1985). 
220. /d. at 872. 
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transaction. The defendant further demonstrated sophistication and 
knowledge of the drug business by offering opinions as to prices for 
narcotics. Additionally, the defendant was able to come forward with 
a large quantity of illegal drugs within a very short period of time. In 
short, the defendant was no "naive person exploited by the govern-
ment .... [Defendant] expressed slight hesitation, which may have 
been caused by the very nature of drug transactions in that a new 
buyer is usually checked and cross-checked to the best of his supplier's 
ability."221 
The predisposition of the defendant may also be shown when the 
defendant's conduct throughout a series of events is consistent over a 
period of time. Government agents approached the defendant in Har-
rison v. State 222 to engage her participation in the sale and delivery of 
drugs. Over a period of time the defendant was twice given the oppor-
tunity to withdraw from the arrangement; however, she had grown 
more relaxed with the situation during this time and ultimately smug-
gled the drugs.223 The defendant in Schneider v. Commonwealth 224 
was convicted of distributing narcotics. The evidence at trial demon-
strated that the defendant was a heavy marijuana user and expected to 
receive some marijuana as compensation for his participation in the 
transaction. During the course of the transaction he made three sepa-
rate trips to arrange the sale and assisted in weighing the marijuana 
and counting the money.225 
Predisposition may also be demonstrated where the defendant not 
only expresses no reluctance toward participating in the transaction, 
but actually expresses eagerness and actively pursues the government 
agents involved in the transaction. In State v. Arnold 226 the govern-
ment agent was not able to find the defendant at home for a third 
meeting regarding a narcotics deal. At that point "defendant ... sin-
221. /d. 
222. 442 A.2d 1377 (Del. 1982) (en bane). 
223. The court in Harrison did express real concern over the extent to which the police 
officers had involved themselves in manufacturing the offense. The court found, however, that 
the statute providing the defense of entrapment was clear, and that the jury had had ample 
evidence to decide the inducement issue. /d. at 1388. One judge, in dissent, went beyond expres-
sing concern with respect to the state of law on this point: 
I confess shock at the absence of a clear federal constitutional restriction on the 
material inducement that a law enforcement officer or his agent can offer to another to 
get the other to commit a crime. While some of the same considerations are present, 
the question of a constitutional restriction is necessarily entirely separate from any leg-
islative or common law intent as to the defense of entrapment. 
/d. (Quillen, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
224. 337 S.E.2d 735 (Va. 1985). 
225. /d. at 737. 
226. 676 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 
91 
AM. J. CRIM. LAW Vol. 14:53 (1987) 
gly pursued [the agent] to consummate the sale and ... produced a 
portable scale to demonstrate the accuracy of the weight of his 
commodity. "227 
Perhaps the most striking recent case in which many of the above 
elements were present is United States v. Roland. 228 The defendant in 
Roland was convicted of paying unlawful gratuities to agents of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service.229 The court's somewhat de-
tailed description of the facts demonstrates the way in which the pros-
ecution can assimilate these various elements in showing 
predisposition: 
The evidence overwhelmingly established that Roland, an at-
torney at the time of the offenses, eagerly participated in a 
scheme to pay money to I.N.S. agents who were cooperating 
with the Government. Over the course of 10 months, Ro-
land paid approximately $43,000 to the agents to obtain alien 
registration documents for his clients. Though obviously 
sensitive to the risk of apprehension ("none of us is wired 
right?") and expressing concern about "[t]hat Abscam case," 
Roland was tape recorded on 65 occasions discussing and 
making his illegal payments and eagerly planning for more of 
them. Not surprisingly, the jury rejected his preposterous 
defense that the payments were part of what he thought was 
a lawful fee-sharing arrangement. Among the numerous 
items of evidence refuting this claim was an episode at which 
Roland showed the agents a newspaper article concerning a 
lawyer who was paying bribes to I.N.S. agents and arranging 
fictitious marriages in order to secure "green cards" for his 
clients; as Roland told the agents whom he was paying, "It's 
exactly what we're doing." He also told the agents to deny 
receiving any payments from him if anyone ever asked any 
questions. 230 
B. Where No Predisposition Is Shown 
The burden of disproving entrapment can be a heavy one for the 
government to meet in jurisdictions using the subjective test. Once the 
defendant has offered sufficient evidence ofinducement,231 the govern-
ment must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was 
227. Id. at 63. 
228. 748 F.2d 1321 (2d Cir. 1984). 
229. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(f) (1982). 
230. 748 F.2d at 1323. 
231. On the question of the sufficiency of evidence of inducement, see Marcus, supra note 2. 
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predisposed to commit the offense. 232 There are many cases that 
demonstrate the difficulty that the government has in meeting its bur-
den with respect to the state of mind of the defendant. Some courts 
focus on the defendant's resistance to the criminal endeavor as well as 
other factors in finding no predisposition. In State v. Devine 233 the 
defendant initially refused to engage in the proposed criminal activity 
and for a while successfully resisted the inducements of the govern-
ment agents. Additionally, there was no evidence that the defendant 
had ever been involved in any prior narcotics transactions, or was even 
generally "prone towards criminality."234 As a result, the court held 
that the evidence showed no predisposition: "The defendant with-
stood the constant pressure until the offer became so attractive that he 
was no longer able to resist.'ms The court in United States v. 
Knight 236 reached a similar result. The defendant in Knight was con-
victed of possession of a "sawed-off" shotgun. The court could not 
find predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt, given that the defend-
ant was initially only willing to sell a shotgun with a legal barrel length 
to the government agent. He was reluctant to saw the barrel off and 
did so only after "repeated Government inducements and [considera-
tion of] the Defendant's precarious financial condition.''237 The court 
concluded there was simply no evidence of predisposition to commit 
the offense. 
In United States v. McLernon 238 the defendant had no prior crim-
inal record relevant to the matter, he had previously served in the mili-
tary and was honorably discharged, and he devoted himself to various 
charitable activities. There was "absolutely no propensity for criminal 
involvement prior to governmental inducement."239 Moreover, the ev-
idence was clear that the government agent initiated the unlawful ac-
tivities and demonstrated to the defendant that his involvement would 
be profitable; the defendant expressed considerable reluctance to par-
ticipate in the drug transactions. The government agent "continually 
232. United States v. Roland, 748 F.2d 1321, 1327 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Navarro, 
737 F.2d 625, 635 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1020 (1984); State v. Burciaga, 146 Ariz. 333, 
335, 705 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Jones, 598 S.W.2d 209, 220 (Tenn. 
1980). 
233. 554 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). 
234. /d. at 449. 
235. /d. See generally United States v. Meyers, 21 M.J. 1007 (A.C.M.R. 1986). 
236. 604 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Ohio 1985). 
237. /d. at 987. 
238. 746 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1984). 
239. /d. at 1 I 12. 
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increased the pressure until [the defendant] finally acquiesced in his 
demands."240 
The defendant in United States v. Lard 241 reacted negatively to 
numerous requests by the government and had no relevant prior crim-
inal record. Yet he was ultimately convicted of transferring a pipe 
bomb. The court strongly condemned the government action in the 
case: 
While law enforcement officials may use strategy, stealth, 
and even deception to catch the "unwary criminal," they 
may not arbitrarily select an otherwise law abiding person, 
gain his confidence, and then proceed to beguile or lure him 
to commit a crime he would not have otherwise attempted. 
It is the government's duty to prevent crime, not to instigate 
or create it.242 
One of the strongest cases refuting the predisposition claim is 
found in an unusual prosecution that involved the sale of protected 
eagles. In United States v. Dion 243 the defendant was a Native Ameri-
can who lived in an isolated area of South Dakota on one of the 
poorest Indian reservations. According to trial witnesses, "life [there] 
is for many Indians, a mere question of simple survival."244 The facts 
evidenced in the Dion case truly were egregious. The government 
"sting" at issue existed over two years. 245 The defendant had never 
killed a protected bird before, had never been involved in making or 
selling protected bird crafts, and believed it was against his Native 
American religious beliefs to shoot an eagle. Indeed, the government 
agents referred to him not as a "street-wise criminal," but instead as a 
"naive first offender." Moreover, the offer of a relatively substantial 
sum of money weighed heavily against a showing of predisposition in 
this case, even though poverty alone would normally not be sufficient: 
However, in some cases, it may be that the unusual pov-
erty of the defendant or other problems peculiar to the de-
240. I d. at 1113. The demands put forth in the McLemon case truly were unique as set out 
in the opinion. The defendant was befriended by the government agent and became so close that 
"they performed the Indian ritual of becoming 'blood brothers.'" The defendant introduced the 
agent to his family stating, "Here's my blood brother; he's going to be one of the family; treat 
him just like the family." I d. at 1113. 
241. 734 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1984). 
242. Id. at 1295. 
243. 762 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 2216 (1986). 
244. Id. at 689. 
245. The court in Dian noted that the Attorney General had recently formulated "Guide· 
lines on FBI Undercover Operations" limiting the duration of undercover operations, at least 
initially, to six months. The court went on to discuss the problems in extending these operations 
over long periods of time. /d. at 686, n.9. 
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fendant must be considered in determining 
predisposition .... In this case, the government agents came 
upon an extremely impoverished Indian reservation in a des-
olate area of South Dakota where, according to some of the 
witnesses at the trial below, life is for many Indians, a mere 
question of simple survival. The risk for the government in 
offering so much money to these individuals over a nearly 
two-and-one-half year period was that many who would 
never have shot a protected bird would be enticed into doing 
so.246 
V. CONCLUSION 
The majority subjective test for entrapment, in sharp contrast to 
the minority objective test, 247 focuses primarily on the actions and 
state of mind of the defendant, rather than on the actions of the gov-
ernment.248 This focus requires the courts to carefully scrutinize the 
evidence as to both the inducement of the government and, more criti-
cally, the predisposition of the defendant. In many prosecutions the 
most difficult problems arise with the attempts of the government to 
prove the predisposition of the defendant. Various forms of proof are 
used in showing this state of mind. Ultimately, however, the determi-
native question is often simply whether the defendant was disposed to 
commit a criminal offense prior to government contact. Alas, the an-
swer to this question is not so simple and is often clouded by criminal 
records of the defendants, substantial government involvement, and 
rather questionable evidence with respect to the defendant and his 
criminal propensity or reputation. 
246. Id. at 689·90. 
247. The test was set out eloquently by Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in Sher-
man v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). 
248. In the objective test, the key inquiry is whether-in the abstract-the government's 
involvement was too overreaching. Id. at 379-81. See Park, supra note 1. 
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